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JOINT TENANCY - CREDITOR-DEBTOR RELATIONS
KENNETH S. TREADWELL* &
JEROME SHULKIN**
The nature of joint tenancy is such that it has created unique
relationships and problems in the creditors' rights field of law. "The
theoretical peculiarity of a joint tenancy at common law, and also by
the law as it still generally prevails,' is the co-existence of the four
unities, the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and
the unity of possession, that is to say, 'joint tenants have one and the
same interest accruing by one and the same conveyance, at one and
the same time, and hold by one and the same undivided possession.'2"'
The principal characteristic of a joint tenancy is survivorship. On the
death of one joint tenant, title passes to the surviving joint tenant or
tenants if there has been no intervening severance of his interest.
"A joint tenancy is always created by act of the parties and never
by operation of law."' The courts and state legislatures in the United
States have attempted to thwart or destroy the acts of the parties in
creating a joint tenancy relationship, resulting in a preference for
finding a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy, or the
abolition of the right of survivorship.5
By Initiative No. 208, adopted and now codified as RCW 64.28, the
former prohibition against joint tenancy with the right of survivorship
has been repealed and substituted with ".... a form of co-ownership
of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy."' The proviso
* Partner, Miracle, Treadwell & Pruzan, Seattle, Washington. Member, Washing-
ton Bar Association.
** Associate, Miracle, Treadwell & Pruzan, Seattle, Washington. Member, Wash-
ington Bar Association.
1 Except perhaps in Iowa where "the intention of the parties should prevail." See
It re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956) ; Switzer v. Pratt, 237
Iowa, 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946) ; Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259 (1936).
2 Porter v. Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E.2d 635 (1942). See also KRATOvIL, REAL
EsTATE LAW 299 (2d ed. 1952).2 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918, 922 (1959). (Footnotes renumbered.)
4 14 Am. JuR. Co-tenancy § 11 (1938) ; MOYNIHAN, SURVEY OF REAL PROPERTY 130
(1940). At common law a conveyance to two or more persons was construed to create
a joint tenancy, in the absence of a contrary expression of intent. After the abolition
of the feudal incidents of tenure, the courts showed a disposition to seize upon any
words that could be construed to indicate an intention to create a tenancy in common
rather than a joint tenancy.
5 See Cross, Joint Tenancy for Washington? 35 WAsa. L. REV. 292, 294 (1960).
Washington destroyed the right of survivorship by statutory enactment. Wash. Terr.
Sess. Laws 1885 at 165.6 RCW 64.28.010 provides: "Joint tenancies with right of survivorship authorized
-Methods of creation-Creditors rights saved. Whereas joint tenancy with right of
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that the transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors raises
serious questions of meaning and interpretation. If the proviso means
that the rights of creditors will not be changed by joint tenancy owner-
ship, then this article will serve little purpose. If the proviso is to be
applied only to the creditors existing at the time of the creation of the
joint tenancy, then all subsequent creditors must look to the common
law for their rights and remedies. If the proviso applies only to the
original transfer creating the joint tenancy, an existing creditor may
ignore the transfer and treat the debtor as the sole owner,' but if the
proviso be given a broader interpretation to permit its application to
the "passage" of title occurring at the death of a joint tenant, it will
create creditors' rights and incidents of joint tenancy beyond the inci-
dents at common law.8 RCW 64.28.010 further provides, "... a joint
tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at
common law." The better approach would be to limit the proviso to
the original transfer, though the matter will not be laid to rest until the
supreme court has passed upon this specific point.
THE SECURED CREDITOR AND JOINT TENANCY
The relationship of joint tenants with their creditors necessarily
divides itself, as in other areas.of law, into transactions with secured
creditors and relationships with the unsecured creditor. The most
frequent voluntary transaction is that of the execution and delivery of
a mortgage by one or more joint tenants to a mortgagee.
The greatest concern of the mortgagee in joint tenancy relationships
with one or more joint tenants, but less than all, is that his security be
survivorship permits property to pass to the survivor without the cost or delay of
probate proceedings, there shall be a form of co-ownership of property, real and per-
sonal, known as joint tenancy. A joint tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship
and severability as at common law. Joint tenancy may be created by written agreement,
written transfer, deed, will or other instrument of conveyance, when expressly declared
therein to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees asjoint tenants: Provided however, That such transfer shall not derogate from the rights
of creditors."
7 The question has already been raised by Professor Cross, supra note 5, at 299-300.
s The Washington Land Title Association, in a paper dated January 24, 1961, and
titled "Joint Tenancy" states at page 6: "The proviso may refer to the original 'trans-
fer' of title which creates a joint tenancy holding or the word 'transfer' as used in the
proviso may be interpreted to relate to the concept, elsewhere expressed in the initia-
tive, of a 'passage' of title to the survivor upon the death of a joint tenant. Until the
Supreme Court has construed the initiative measure in this regard, it is quite obvious
that the proviso must be interpreted as applying both to creation of the joint tenancy
and to the 'passage' of title occurring at the time of death of a joint tenant." This con-
clusion is not "quite obvious," for the doctrine of survivorship is based upon the theory
that the joint tenants together own but one estate, and the death of one merely extin-
guishes his claim to the estate. The survivor or survivors take no new title, nor has
there been any "passage" of title to them. 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 419 (3d ed.
1939) ; In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935).
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protected from the consequences of the death or termination of the
interests of one of the joint tenants and the ensuing survivorship
characteristics. The transformation of the mortgagor's joint tenancy
interest to an interest in common will be desired by the mortgagee
whose security instrument has been executed by less than all of the
joint tenants. This is accomplished by a termination of the right of
survivorship, called severance.' The destruction of any of the four
unities (time, title, interest and possession) results in a severance
which terminates the joint tenancy, and abolition of the right of sur-
vivorship. The parties would then hold as tenants in common.
Where giving a mortgage does not sever the joint tenancy relation-
ship the consequences of a mortgagee taking security from one or
more, but less than all of the joint tenants, may be disastrous, as
illustrated in People v. Norgarr.'° In Norgarr, one joint tenant, with-
out the knowledge or consent of his co-tenant, mortgaged his un-
divided interest in land. After his death the mortgagee's claim to an
interest in the land was upheld by the trial court. On appeal by the
surviving joint tenant, the trial court was reversed. Since the mortgage
executed by one of two joint tenants was only a lien or charge on the
mortgaging joint tenant's interest and did not operate to transfer the
legal or any other title to the mortgagee nor entitle him to possession,
none of the unities essential to the joint tenancy were destroyed and
the joint tenancy was not severed. When the mortgaging joint tenant
died, his interest ceased to exist and the lien of the mortgage expired
with it, leaving the surviving, non-mortgaging joint tenant to take the
property free of the lien. The court reasoned that since California is a
"lien theory" state, (as opposed to a "title theory" state), the unity of
title was not impaired.11
The Norgaar case is important, because Washington falls into the
camp of lien theory states,12 and only one other lien state seems to
have passed upon the problem.3 There appears to be little justification
9 The severance could occur by a sale or other voluntary transfer by one or more of
the joint tenants, or by the act of a third party; e.g., attachment or execution sale re-
sulting in an involuntary severance.
10 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
11 164 Cal. App. 2d 591 at 593-94, 330 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See
11 STAN. L. REv. 574, 575 (1959), for a critical comment.
12 Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. deft., 329 U.S. 800
(1947) ; Seattle Savings & Loan Ass'n v. King County, 189 Wash. 563, 65 P.2d 1274
(1937) ; Cochran v. Cochran, 114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 224 (1921).
13Wilkns v. Young, 149 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895). Accord, Tracy-Collins Trust
Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 356, 301 P2d 1086, 1090 (1956) (dictum). The court in
the Norgarr case rejected the Wilkins decision, stating that it relied upon holdings in
title theory jurisdictions.
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for the decision in the Norgarr case. The only substantial difference
between the title and lien theories is that in title jurisdictions the
mortgagee is given a right of entry, which he is denied in lien jurisdic-
tions.1 The justification for holding that there is a severance upon
giving a mortgage, even in a lien theory jurisdiction, is not upon any
destruction of the unity of title, but rather that the unity of interest is
destroyed."
If the Norgarr case represents the lien theory approach to the
severance question, (and technically speaking it is not the mortgagee's
interest with which we are concerned here, but rather, whether or not
there is a severance which terminated the right of survivorship), then
the Washington courts may face a dilemma. The title theory states
and England, representing the common law, hold that there is a sever-
ance upon the giving of a mortgage and the joint tenants become
tenants in common," while the lien theory appears to be that there
is no severance upon the giving of the mortgage; at least without the
knowledge and consent of the other joint tenants." But what of that
portion of RCW 64.28.010 which provides ".... a joint tenancy shall
have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common
law"? Is this a mandate that the common law theory, i.e. the title
theory, be adopted in our otherwise lien theory jurisdiction? It is sub-
mitted that no matter which label is given, the better approach is that
there is a severance of the unity of interest, and the lien of the mort-
gage attaches to the property even after the death of the mortgaging
joint tenant. Other methods of protecting the mortgagee have been
proposed, but they deviate from common law."
There appears to be no basis for supposing that the mere act of both
or all of the joint tenants in executing a mortgage on the joint property
will sever the joint tenancy. 9 Whether there has been a severance is
14 OSORNF. M ORTGAGS § 15 (1951).
15 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2 (Casner ed. 1952).
"'Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, 1 Binn 175, 2 Am. Dec. 425 (Pa. 1806); In re
Pollard's Estate, 3 De G. J. & S. 541, 46 Eng. Rep. 746 (Ch. 1863) ; Gale v. Gale, 2
Cox's Ch. Cas. 136, 30 Eng. Rep. 63 (Ex. 1789) ; York v. Stone, 1 Salk 158, 91 Eng.
Rep. 146 (Ch. 1709) ; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918, 934 (1959).
17 People v. Norgarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
1s See 11 STAN. L. REv. 574, 577 (1959), where three separate means of protecting
the mortgage have been cited: "First, the joint estate may remain intact, the survivingjoint tenant taking the land subject to the mortgagee's interest. Second, survivorship
may be suspended during the term of the mortgage. During this period of suspension
the estate of a deceased joint tenant will go to his heirs, and removal of the mortgage
will re-establish the full incidents of the joint tenancy. Third, the right of survivorship
may be completely destroyed, creating an estate in common."
11 In Illinois Public Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 Ill. 2d 344, 153 N.E2d 59, 63-4 (1958),
the court stated that "it has been assumed" that where both joint tenants join in the
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of no concern to the mortgagee because his lien is effective against all
of the property. Since the unity affected by a mortgage is the unity
of interest, it would seem clear that there would be no severance
where all owners joined in the mortgage, since the interest of each
would be identical. From a practical standpoint, few financial institu-
tions would risk loaning funds to a joint tenant unless all of the joint
tenants jointed in the transaction. The problem will arise where secu-
rity is hastily taken to secure an antecedent debt, and in chattel
transactions where the husband, as the statutory agent of the com-
munity, effects transactions under his sole signature, often without the
knowledge of his wife. In this latter situation, the lender may wisely
determine the character of ownership of the chattel or demand the
wife's signature on the security instrument as a precaution.
STATUTORY LIENS
Persons who perform labor, furnish materials or supply equipment
who are otherwise entitled to a lien by statute will have to exercise
a new degree of caution, particularly in situations where the owner or
reputed owners are husband and wife. The lien claimant, particularly
the materialman, who generally does a poor job of preparing and filing
his lien, will have to make a record search or make inquiry to deter-
mine the character of the ownership so that he may protect his lien
by proper notice.
If the person ordering the work to be performed is the agent of the
owner, then the owner's property is subjected to the lien,2" but it is not
always easy to prove that the person ordering the work to be done
has the authority to order the performance.2
In order to enforce his lien, the materialman must give notice within
mortgage there is no severance, "and that when the mortgage is released the joint
tenancy continues unimpaired."
20 RCW 60.04.010.
21 In Larson v. Duclos, 46 Wn.2d 334, 281 P.2d 458 (1955), the husband was the
administrator of the wife's estate and there were two minor children. The husband
ordered extensive repairs and additions made to the family residence. The materialmen
gave timely statutory notice to the husband and filed liens. Upon foreclosure the lower
court held the liens to be valid against the interests of the minor children. On appeal the
court reversed the judgment to the extent that it impressed liens on the interests of the
children. The court stated that if the liens against the interests of the children were
to be upheld it could be done only by recognizing the validity of the act of the admin-
istrator, keeping in mind that he had never applied for nor received authority or
approval of the court to bind the estate or the interests of anyone therein. The court
concluded, "If the administrator cannot charge against the estate the cost of erecting
an addition to estate property, in the absence of court approval, it follows that no lien
attached to the interest of the minor heirs in the instant case." Id. at 339, 281 P.2d at
461.
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ten days after first delivery22 to the owner or reputed owner of the
property to the effect that he has furnished materials or supplies, and
that he claims a lien.23 Where community property is involved the
lien claimant is protected in his notice as against the spouse who does
not receive the statutory notice.2 This convenient protection will not
be available to the lien claimant where the husband and wife own as
joint tenants, and unless the materialman gives the statutory notice to
all of the joint tenants, his lien, which otherwise may be valid against
the whole property, will be enforceable only against :the undivided
interest of the joint tenant to whom he gives notice.
Unlike a mortgage, a statutory lien is inchoate until reduced to
judgment, and until such time as the lienor has severed the joint
tenancy his lien on the property of one or more, but less than all of
the joint tenants will expire upon the death of the joint tenant.
Real and chattel mortgage transactions and statutory lien situations
are the only major secured creditor areas in which the adoption of
joint tenancy will be a caveat to the creditor.
THE UNSECURED CREDITOR AND JOINT TENANCY
The unsecured creditor of one or more, but less than all of the
joint tenants, fares somewhat better in his pursuit for recovery of his
claim than does the unsecured creditor holding a separate claim
against one of the spouses in a community property relationship. In
the community property relationship the separate creditor cannot,
reach the community assets to satisfy his claim,25 while a separate
creditor of one joint tenant can reach the undivided interest of the
joint tenant in property held in co-tenancy.
Attachment and garnishment, coupled with levy of execution are the
legal weapons of the unsecured creditor. Generally, every kind of
property or interest therein, not otherwise exempt, may be reached
by an execution issued on judgment." The problems that arise relate
22 Sixty days for construction, alteration or repairs to buildings, wharfs, etc., other
than single family residences or garages. RCW 60.04.020.
23 RCW 60.04.020.
24 RCW 60.04.160 "Effect of filing claim on community interest. The claim of lien,
when filed as required by this chapter, shall be notice to the husband or wife of the
person who appears of record to be the owner of the property sought to be charged with
the lien, and shall subject all the community interest of both husband and wife to said
lien."
25 See Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919). In addition to the un-
availability of the whole of the community property to the claims of a separate creditor,
the separate obligation cannot be enforced against the debtor's half interest in commu-
nity property. Stockland v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892).
20 33 C.J.S. Executions § 18 (1942).
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to the acts which give rise to a severance of the joint tenancy, the
rights and relationships of the co-tenants under a redemption, and
the status of the creditor if the judgment debtor dies.
Where the creditor has reduced his claim to judgment, a writ of
execution may be levied on the interest of a judgment debtor in land."7
"Usually this is done by levying on the entire tract, joining all owners
as parties defendant; and such a levy will be valid as to the debtor's
portion. 2 9
In the case of land transactions, there is some question as to whether
a severance of the joint tenancy will occur upon the levy of execution,
the sale on execution, or only after the sheriff's deed has been issued.
The authorities are clear, however, that a mere judgment lien against
a joint tenant's interest in joint property is not, of itself, sufficient to
operate as a severance of the joint tenancy. 9
If the creditor is paid out of the proceeds of judicial sale it makes
little difference when the severance does occur, but if he becomes the
purchaser of an undivided interest it is of extreme importance to him. 0
The longer the creditor has to wait until his claim severs the joint
tenancy and ripens into a tenancy in common with the other co-tenants,
the greater the opportunity for the death of the debtor and the expira-
tion of the claim. It has been held in some cases that a levy of execu-
tion against the interest or share of one joint tenant is effective to
sever the joint tenancy," while the generally accepted view is that
the severance does not occur until the sale on execution, 2 the theory
being that the making of a levy of execution upon the interest of a
joint tenant debtor would not be such an act as would sever the joint
estate, since the levy gives no greater interest then that which the
judgment creditor already possesses.83 The right of possession may be
27 RCW 6.04.110 "Levy on joint realty. When a defendant in execution owns real
estate subject to execution, jointly or in common with any other person, the judgment
shall be a lien, and the execution be levied upon the interest of the defendant only.'
RCW 6.04.120 covers the levy on joint personalty.
28 See Comment, Execution Against Co-Tenants, 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 351, 357
(1946).2 9 Ziegler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P2d 118 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) ; Van
Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945) ; People's Trust & Say. Bank v.
Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (1927) ; Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432,
272 N.W. 657 (1937); Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1139 (1946).
30 And, of course, it is extremely important to the third party purchaser, who pur-
chases no more than the sheriff can convey.
31 Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 Atl. 890 (Ch. 1932) ; Davidson v.
Heydon, 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1799) ; American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa.
Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939) ; Annot., 161 A.L.R.. 1139, 1141 (1946).
32 See Annots., 161 A.L.R. 1139, 1140 (1946); 159 A.L.R. 395, 397 (1945); 111
A.L.R. 171, 173 (1937).
33 Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945).
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the criterion as to whether the purchaser of an undivided interest at
a judicial sale becomes a tenant in common with the owner of the
remaining interest. If the debtor has the right to remain in possession
for a period after the sale, then a severance of the joint tenancy and
the conversion into a tenancy in common may occur only after the
right to possession by the debtor has expired or is released. Under
this view, if the debtor dies while still vested with a right to possession,
the co-tenants will take the whole by survivorship, free of the credi-
tor's judgment. Such would be the case in a mortgage foreclosure sale
on the debtor's homestead, and the mortgagee of one joint tenant
would lose his interest to the survivor. While the unity of title and
the unity of possession are not severed, it should still be the better
view that the unity of interest has been severed at the time of the
execution of the mortgage.
While one ponders whether there is a severance upon the levy of
execution, or only after the execution sale, a third view is suggested
which may well control the court in Washington should the question
arise. That is, that there will be no severance of the joint tenancy
until such time as the sheriff's deed is delivered to the purchaser.
The Washington Supreme Court has long and consistently held that
a certificate of sale executed by a sheriff does not vest title, being at
most but evidence of an inchoate estate that may or may not ripen
into an absolute title.35 Accordingly, there will be no severance of
the unity of title until the sheriff's deed is delivered, and if a declara-
tion of homestead has been timely filed, judgment debtors have the
right to possession during the period of redemption under RCW
6.24.210, even though homestead is subject to execution under the
provisions of RCW 6.12.100,3" so the unity of possession is not dis-
turbed. The judgment creditor then, who has a sheriff's certificate of
sale, without the right to possession (assuming a homestead declara-
tion is applicable) will not sever the joint tenancy during the period
of redemption. If the court should adopt a theory that the right of
survivorship, is suspended during the period of redemption, then upon
34 Hay v. Crawford, 159 Kan. 723, 158 P.2d 463 (1945). See Annot, 159 A.L.R. 395,
396 (1945).35 Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Helgerson, 188 Wash. 176, 61 P.2d 1267 (1936) : At-
wood v. McGrath, 137 Wash. 400, 242 Pac. 648 (1926) ; Ford v. Nokomis State Bank,
135 Wash. 37, 237 Pac. 314 (1925). The rule once was that the certificate of purchase
and confirmation of sale were alone essential to pass the substantial title of the debtor.
Diamond v. Turner, 11 Wash. 189, 192, 39 Pac. 379 (1895).
'3 First Nat'l Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wn.2d 193, 242 P.2d 169 (1952), overruling, State
ex rel. Ritchie v. Douglas, 198 Wash. 564, 89 P2d 227 (1939) and First Nat!I Bank v.
Mapson, 181 Wash. 196, 42 P.2d 782 (1935).
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redemption the joint tenancy would continue," provided RCW 64.
28.010 does not prohibit such a theory. If the historical approach, i.e.
the tenancy in common favored over joint tenancy, is any guide, then
the courts will probably reject the suspension theory.
When the purchaser at the sale is entitled to possession, or where
a sheriff's deed has been issued, the purchaser becomes a tenant in
common with the other co-tenants, and partition is the more obvious
method of reducing his interest to cash.
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The interests of a co-owner of a joint bank account with a right of
survivorship is subject to garnishment or seizure under an execution
against such owner, and generally the execution or garnishment has the
effect of creating a tenancy in common and terminates the right of
survivorship. 8 :The entire account may be subject to seizure under
execution against one depositor." Though the label of joint tenancy
is attached. to joint-and survivorship bank accounts, courts have often
recognized that a true joint tenancy does not exist. Consequently,
whenever joint tenancy law contravenes the real nature of the account,
courts; though using joint tenancy terminology, do not reach joint
tenancy results.40 Legislation has not been of much assistance in this
respect, though almost all of the state legislatures have enacted joint
tenancy provisions for bank accounts. 1 Interestingly, little litigation
has occurred in this area of creditors' rights.
BANKRUPTCY
:'A joint tenancy -can be severed by one of the tenants by conveying
his interest in the property. Accordingly, the voluntary or involuntary
filing of a petition in bankruptcy by one of the joint tenants severs the
relationship 'and vests an undivided interest in the trustee. 2 The
37 Professor Cross raises the suspension argument in Cross, Joint Tenancy for
Vaihington?, 35 WAsH. L. Rxv. 292, 298 (1960). See also, Comment, 11 STAN. L.
REv. 574, 577 (1959).38 Dover Trust C6. v. Brooks, 111 NJ. Eq. 40, 160 Atl. 890 (Ch. 1932) ; 33 C.J.S.
Executions § 38 (1942). The same questions of severance as in executions against real
property should be applicable.
39 Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 473, 47 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
40 See Note, 42 IOWA L. Rxv. 551 and cases cited n.58 at 561 (1957).
4'1 RCW 30.20.015 (commercial banks); RCW 31.12.140 (credit unions); RCW
32.12.030(3) (mutual savings banks) ; RCW 33.20.030 (savings and loan institutions).
In re Ivers' Estate, 4 W n2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940), lends support to the suggestion
that these statutes were enacted for the protection of the depository.
,12 In re DePree, 30 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 629 (W.D. Mich. 1935) ; In re Brown,
60 F.2d 269, 21 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 359 (W.D. Ky. 1932) ; 3 REmiNGTON, BANK-
RUPTCY § 1260 (1957).
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trustee of any of the owners, whether in part or in whole, is entitled
to whatever interest the bankrupt on the date of bankruptcy could
have lawfully transferred or which was subject to levy by any of his
creditors." When the trustee sells the undivided interest of the bank-
rupt at a bankruptcy sale, the purchaser becomes a co-tenant with the
owner of the remaining undivided interest in the property.44
EXEMPTIONS
The interest of a joint tenant in personal property should be avail-
able to him under a claim of exemption from execution or attachment,
provided the claimant otherwise qualifies as a householder.45 Where
the joint tenants are husband and wife, the wife's interest in the
property held in co-tenancy (being her separate property) is exempt
from execution and attachment except for her individual debts or those
obligations categorized as family expenses.46
Where the statutory requisites are present most jurisdictions hold
that a joint tenant may select a homestead in the undivided common
property. This rule is based on the sound public policy that home-
stead statutes are intended to protect a person in his home and that
the character of his title is secondary thereto. A small minority of
states reach a contrary conclusion which is usually based on strictly
worded homestead statutes that prohibit selection of a homestead in
property owned in common.' Where the husband holds as co-tenant
with someone other than his wife, or where the husband and wife own
as co-tenants with one or more other co-tenants, it is held that the
consent of the other co-tenant to the occupancy of the homestead by
the claimant is not necessary to sustain the exemption in a contest
with creditors. 9 The lack of consent by a joint tenant from the other
joint tenants to occupancy of the common property is not a matter
that creditors should be able to raise.
The usual situation will arise where the husband and wife only are
holding as joint tenants. The Washington statutes provide that a
homestead consists of the dwelling house in which the claimant resides
43 Butterer v. Santow, 24 N.J. Super. 361, 94 A2d 525 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1933) ; 4
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.18(7) (1942).
44 asper State Bank v. Braswell, 107 S.W2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), rev'd on
other grounds, 130 Tex. 549, 111 S.W.2d 1079 (1938) ; Battle v. John, 49 Tex. 202
(1878) ; Annot., 159 A.L.R. 395, 399 (1945).
45 RCNV 6.16.
46 RCW 6.16.070; 26.16.205.
47 Annot., 89 A.L.R. 511 (1934).
48 Id. at 548.
4926 Am. Juo. Homesteads § 62 (1940).
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and the land on which the same is situated, or land without improve-
ments purchased with the intention of building a house and residing
thereon. 0 The homestead may be selected by the husband from com-
munity property or his separate property."' The homestead cannot
be selected from the separate property of the wife by the husband
without her consent, which can be evidenced only by her making the
declaration of homestead. 2 The homestead declaration may be made
by the wife out of her separate property and that of her husband, by
showing that her husband has not made such declaration and that she
is making the declaration for their joint benefit." Assuming that
Washington will follow the majority rule and permit a claim of home-
stead to be made out of jointly owned real property," there still re-
mains the limitation on who may make the declaration. A declaration
made by the husband will isolate only his interest in the common
property. On the other hand, a declaration made by the wife could
include not only her interest but also the interest of her husband
where the declaration is made for their joint benefit. Until the leg-
islature sees fit to remedy this situation, the careful lawyer will have
the declaration executed by both husband and wife.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of joint tenancy creates numerous problems in itself,
but the problems are compounded by the language of RCW 64.28.010,
the most obvious of which is the proviso affecting creditors. It will
take extensive litigation and probably legislation to clarify the many
questions raised.
Severance of a joint tenancy interest, particularly the event upon
50 RCW 6.12.010.
51 RCW 6.12.020.
5s RCW 6.12.030.
53 RCW 6.12.060(1).
54 There is no requirement as to character of ownership. See State ex rel. Van
Doren v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 241, 37 P.2d 215 (1934), which held that a debtor
could properly claim a homestead in an apartment of a building of several stories con-
taining thirty-five apartments. The court said, "There is no limitation or qualification
to the effect that the real estate selected shall be of any particular area or description.
... The only limitations prescribed are residence and value." Id. at 243,37 P. 2d at 215-16.
55 The California Civil Code contains homestead statutes similar to those of Wash-
ington. The courts, however, followed the minority rule and held that a homestead
could not be claimed out of an undivided interest in real estate. By statuory amend-
ment, adopted in 1929, a spouse was permitted to declare a homestead in property held
by both as joint tenants. Prior to the statutory amendment the courts had ruled that
although a husband could not claim a homestead in property held in joint tenancy, the
wife could for she had a right under the Code to declare a homestead in her separate
property and also in the separate property of her husband. See Swan v. Walden, 156
Cal. 195, 103. Pac. 931 (1909).
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which it takes effect, will be a major area of concern to secured and
unsecured creditors who deal with one or more but less than all of
the joint tenants. The debtor, in order to isolate his property from
claims of creditors will face new problems, particularly where a home-
stead is claimed out of property held in joint tenancy. Creditors
having contractual or statutory lien rights will be most concerned
with the character of ownership, and the wife's individual obligation
will undoubtedly be sought on more commercial transactions.
